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CAPACITY UNDER THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAWS OF THE AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY*
Luis M. RamJrez B.t

C

LOSELY related to the legal rules that regulate the different aspects and effects of endorsement is the question of capacity to
endorse bills of exchange. This forms part of negotiatory capacity in
general, which, in a broad sepse, may be defined as the faculty of a person to acquire rights and to assume obligations on negotiable instruments.
I. The Problems of Legal Capacity
The several aspects or phases of negotiatory capacity, which may be
considered in the present connection, can be stated as follows: (I) what
laws are to control in determining capacity and incapacity; (2) what
persons have capacity to contract negotiatory obligations; (3) what are
the effects of the obligations ( e.g., endorsements) of persons without
capacity, as respects (a) the obligations contracted by incompetents and
(b) the other obligations that appear on the bill.
Although these three aspects are of interest for the unification of
legislation and have significance in the law of negotiable instruments,
they are not of equal importance. It is possible to attain a uniform law
on bills of exchange without having uniformity in these three respects.
It is clear that the ideal wound be to unify the applicable rules, but,
for the time being, this seems difficult to accomplish. It must be recalled that the laws on bills of exchange are not isolated legal institutions which have complete life in themselves, but that each is
intimately related to a functioning legal system, be it called common
law ( and law merchant), or code of commerce and civil code.
Legislative uniformity, as stated, is attainable without having uniformity in the three respects indicated, two methods being available to
resolve the problems involved. These methods are: (I) unification of
the effects of obligations contracted on bills by persons without capacity,
for example, by endorsement, particularly with respect to other obligations appearing thereon; and ( 2) through that harmony in the sel~ction

* This article is part of a monograph entitled "Negotiation of Bills of Exchange"
prepared by the author in connection with the Research in Inter-American law described
by Professor Yntema at page 549 supra. The editors plan to publish parts of other
similar monographs in future issues of the REVIEW.-Ed.
Abogado, Universidad Nacional, Asuncion, Paraguay; LL.M., Harvard Law
School; research fellow, University of Michigan Law School.-Ed.
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of the applicable rules, which should characterize the determination of
capacity. In this manner, it may be brought about that bills of exchange circulate freely and with certainty.
,
This is the method followed in the Uniform Regulation of The
Hague Convention and in the Uniform Law of the Geneva Convention. Thus, articles 7 and 7, respectively, regulate the effects of the
signatures of persons without capacity, while article 74 of The Hague
_Uniform Regulation and article 2 of the Geneva Convention on Conflicts of Laws provide the applicable norms for determination of negotiatory capacity. Once the applicable law is determined, this "national"
law 1 will determine who have capacity. Moss; states that the questions
of capacity, representation, cancellation, protest, etc., do not directly
concern the Uniform Law. 2
In accordance with the purpose of this work, the following aspects
of the subject will be examined below: (I) what persons have capacity
to endorse bills of exchange; and (2) what are the effects of endorsement by a person without capacity upon other obligations appearing
on a bill of exchange. The determination of the applicable law and the
effects of endorsement,by a person without capacity, as concerns his own
obligation, are aspects that fall ~ithout the. scope of this study.
Negotiatory Capacity·
In nego_tiatory capacity, according to J\:1ossa, a distinctioIJ. should be
made between active and passive capacity. Active capacity is the power
of a person to acquire a negotiatory right. Passive capacity is the power
of a person to assume negotiatory obligations. Both may refer to the
creation of a bill or to other acts constituting negotiatory obligations,
such as endorsement.
Active negotiatory capacity is identified with capacity in general (in
law and in fact). Any person, whether natural or legal, has capacity in
the active sense, conformably to the ordinary rules :respecting such persons, and thus may acquire the right incorporated in a document or instrument. Passive negotiatory capacity, on the other hand, is more
restricted and principally refers not to capacity in law, but to capacity in
fact or to act, with which, as a general rule, it coinciq.es.11 Consequently,
passive negotiatory capacity or, in other words, to ascertain when a
2.

i The word "national" is used to designate the law that governs in each country,
,in contrast to the Uniform Law.
2 Mossa, "Legge uniforme e 'nuova letteratura cambiaria" { I 93 6} 34 Riv. D. CoM.
(It.} 128.
3
Cf. 1 MossA, LA CAMBIALE SECONDO LA NUOVA LEGGE 241 (Milano, 1937).
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natural or legal person can contract a negotiatory obligation,4 is the
more interesting. And it is to this that the statutory provisions usually
refer.
Capacity to endorse bills of exchange is determined, generally, by
the capacity to contract negotiatory obligations, and, in turn, capacity to
contract negotiatory obligations, in general, is governed by ordinary
capacity to contract.
Article I of the Budapest Rules relating to ]3ills of Exchange prescribed that capacity to contract by means of a bill of exchange shall be
determined by the general capacity to contract. 5 This rule is well
founded, since:
The subject of capacity derives from the common law (direito

comum), and, such being the case, the legal capacity of an individual to carry on trade is proportionate to his civil capacity; one
is measured by the other. It follows therefrom that, in reference
to capacity, the only regulation possible is that of the civil law,
and, consequently, whenever the civil law modifies, by broadening or restricting, in a general way, the capacity of the citizen, this
modification prevails over any other disposition of an equally general character.6
The Swiss Federal Code of Obligations, in the first part of article
720, contains a provision similar to that of the Budapest Rules.7
4

Section 47 of the Canadian Bills of Exchange Act would seem to be a good
illustration of the distinction between the two types of negotiatory capacity and of the
importance of passive capacity. It provides that:·
"Capacity to incur liability as a party to a bill is co-extensive with capacity to
contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall enable a corporation to make itself
liable as drawer, acceptor or endorser, of a bill, unless it is competent to it so to do under
the law for the time being in force relating to such corporation."
This provision refers only to passive capacity, it seeming to follow therefrom that any
corporation, even without authority in its charter, can acquire a right under a negotiable
instrument.
5
lnternational Law Association, Budapest, 1908, Report 592.
6
"A materia de capacidade e de direito comum e, assim sendo, a capacidade
juridica para o individuo comerciar esta na mesma propor~ao de sua capacidade civil;
uma se afere pela outra. Segue-se dai que, em materia de capacidade, a regulamenta~ao
unica possivel e a do direito civil e consequentemente todas as vezes que la lei civil
modificar, ampliando o restringindo, de um modo geral a capacidade do cidadao, esta
modifi~ao prevalece sobre qualquer dispositivo de carater eguaimente geral." Paulino
Neto, "Dois ensaios de direito commercial" (1935) 3 REV. JuR. (Rio) 160 et seq.
7
"Toute personne capable de s'obliger par contrat peut s'obliger par lettre de
change."
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3. American Legislations
The countries of America treat negotiatory -capacity in different
ways, both in the mode of defining it and in the determination of the
persons affected. There follows a review of the provisions of each
country, classified in three groups.
(I) The Argentine, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan Codes of Commerce; in the general provisions on bills of exchange, contain no disposition on the capacity of persons, but only particular rules on endorsement and aval.
The general basis for negotiatory capacity is to be found in the
common rule which provides that persons who have attained majority
and have free administration of their property, and such persons as
acquire capacity to assume obligations before majority, can contract.8
Therefore, in order to know who have capacity to assume negotiatory
obligations, including endorsement, it is necessary to resort to the provisions which determine who have capacity to contract.
The codes under consideration contain, in addition, special rules
enabling legal representatives to endorse.9 It is provided that:
Those who succeed to the rights of an insolvent holder and
the executors or legal representatives of a deceased creditor, have
authority to endorse. 10
Two criticisms may be made of this provision: (a) the situations
contemplated do not properly pertain to the law of negotiability; 11
they are subjects that should be regulated in the parts relating to bank8
The general principle is based on articles 52, 53, 128, and 129 of the Argentine
and Paraguayan Civil Code, and on article 9, and in general Chapter II of Title I of
Book I, of the Argentine and Paraguayan Code of Commerce. Cf. C. A. Cordoba,
20.III.1918, l JuRis. ARG. 323: only persons having capacity to execute mercantile acts
can incur obligations by bills of exchange. For Uruguay, see articles l 278 to 128 l of
the Uruguayan Civil Code, and article 8, and in general Chapter II, Title I, of Book I,
of the Uruguayan Code of Commerce.
9
Articles 630, 631, and 632 of the Argentine and Paraguayan Code of Commerce
and articles 826, 827, and 828 of the Uruguayan Code of Commerce. Articles 630
and 826 will be dealt with in considering the capacity of married women.
10
"Los que suceden en los derechos de un portador insolvente y los albaceas o
representantes legales de un acreedor muerto, tienen autorizaci6n para hacer los
endosos." Arg.-C. Com., art. 63 l; Parag.-C. Com., art. 63 l; Urµg.-C. Com.,
art. 827.
11
Cf. 4 MALAGARRIGA, C6D1Go DE CoMERc10 coMENTADo SEGUN LA DOCTRINA y
LA JURISPRUDENCIA, 3d ed., 160 (Buenos Aires, 1928).
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ruptcy and to the law of succession; (b) while the Argentine, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan laws consider endorsement a true draft: 12
It is not a right applicable exclusively to endorsement, justifying such particularity in the law.13
The other special provision on the power of representatives to endorse is the following:
If a bill is payable to a business house composed of various
partners, endorsement by only one of the partners, whose name appears in rhe firm name or who is entitled to us<! the signature, is
considered the act of the company.14
This provision is merely a repetition of the principles set forth in the
codes of commerce in the part referring to partnerships.15
12

Arg.-C. Com., art. 625; Parag.-C. Com., art. 625; Urug.-C. Com., art.

822.
13

"No es un derecho aplicable exclusivamente al endoso para que la ley se particularice en esa forma.'' I WILLIAMS, LA LETRA DE CAMBIO EN LA DOCTRINA, LEGISLACION Y JURISPRUDENCIA 234 (Buenos Aires, 1930).
These articles refer to an "insolvent" holder. According to 2 SEGOVIA, ExPLICACION
Y CRITICA DEL NUEVO C6mGo DE CoMERCIO DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA 126, n.
2131 (Buenos Aires, 1933), "En la palabra insolvente se ha querido comprender al
fallido.'' Those who succeed to the rights of an insolvent holder are creditors of the
estate, who will be represented either by the trustee or the liquidator, or by whoever may
be the referee. Cf. REBORA, LETRAS DE CAMBIO, 3d ed., 195 (Paris, 1928). These
are subjects directly related to the law of bankruptcy, examination of which does not
concern this work.
The second part of the provisions under consideration deals with the executors and
legal representatives of a deceased creditor. This provision is subject to similar criticisms.
The subject is directly related to the law of succession; moreover, there is no reason to
make a particular provision for endorsements.
14
"Si la letra es pagadera a una casa de comercio compuesta de varios socios, el
endoso de uno solo de los socios, cuyo nombre .figura en la raz6n social o que tenga
el uso de la firma, se considera como acto de la sociedad.'' Arg.-C. Com., art. 632;
Parag.-C. Com., art. 632; Urug.-C. Com., art. 828.
15
• See articles 305 of the Code of Commerce of Argentina and Paraguay and 457
of the Code of Commerce of Uruguay. The provision under consideration refers to
partnerships, since it speaks of a commercial house composed of various partners and of
the .firm name, things which corporations do not have. See articles 310, 313, and 314
of the Argentine and Paraguayan Code of Commerce and 453, 403, and 404 of'the
Uruguayan Code of Commerce.
Two principles appear in the articles under consideration:
(a) Endorsement by one of the partners whose name appears in the .firm name is
considered as the act of the partnership. And, "with respect to third parties" may be
added, since liability among the partners is always possible. Articles 305 of the Argentine and Paraguayan Code of Commerce and 457 of the Uruguayan Code of Commerce
provide that:
"Los socios que por clausula expresa del contrato social esten exclu1dos de contratar a
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( 2) Among the countries which have a general provision on capacity to assume negotiatory obligations, Bolivia, in article 367 of the Mercantile Code, provides that, with respect to the drawer or acceptor of a
bill of exchange who is ]].Ot a merchant, the bill has no effect other than,
that of a simple. promissory note under the common civil jurisdiction,
except for the right of the holder to demand its value from anyone who
may have intervened. This means, then, that, in order to draw or accept
a bill, it is necessary to be a merchant. This is the general principle, but
this provision will J1ot apply, when a non-merchant has drawn or accepted a bill by reason of some mercantile operation in which he was
engaged. The principle followed by this code, that the use or employment of bills of exchange is limited to merchants or to cases involving
mercantile transactions, today is definitely abandoned.
With respect to endorsements, the same code, in article 368, enacts
that endorsements on bills of exchange shall give rise to all their
effects against whoever have made them, saving the. law (fuero) applicable to an endorser who does not engage in commerce. It seems to
follow from this provision that any person with-capacity to contract can
'endorse a bill of exchange, but without prejudice to the application of
the civil law, if h,e does not engage in commerce.
In the other countries, capacity to contract governs negotiatory
capacity, and the latter governs capacity to endorse bills of exchange.
Brazil 16 and Mexico 11 enact the general principle without addition. It
nombre de la sociedad, y de usar de su firma, no la obligaran con sus actos particulares,
aunque tomen para hacerlo el nombre de la compafifa.
"Sin embargo, si los nombres de esos socios estuviesen incluidos en la raz6n social,
soportara la sociedad la resulta de estos actos, salvo su derecho de indemnizaci6n contra
los bienes particulares del socio que hubiese obrado sin autorizaci6n."
(b) Endorsement by. a person entitled to use the signature of the firm is considered
the act of the partnership. This is an application of a provision in another part of the
Code, that:
"La raz6n social equivale plenamente a la firma de cada uno de los socioi. Los
obliga a todos, como si todos hubieran efectivamente firmado. • • ." Arg.- C: Com.,
art. 303; Parag.-C. Com., art. 303; Urug.-C. Com., art. 455.
·
An exception is made of the case where the firm name is used in transactions manifestly foreign to the transactions defined in the partnership contracts. Arg.- C. Com.,
art. 320, parr. 2; Parag.-C. Com., art. 3~0, parr. 2; Urug.-C. Com., art. 454,
parr. 2.
.
16
Bra.-Dec. 2044, art_. 42:
"Pode obrigar-se, por letra de cambio, quern tem a capacidade civil ou commercial •••"
'
'
17
Mex.-Ley General de Titulos y Operaciones de Credito, art. 3:
"To,dos los que tengan capacidad legal para contratar, conforme a las leyes que
menciona el articulo anterior, podran efectuar las operaciones a que se refieren esia Ley,
salvo. aquellas que requieran concesi6n o autorizaci6n especial."
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follows from these provisions that to undertake a negotiatory obligation it is not necessary to be a merchant and that one prohibited to
engage in commerce nevertheless can contract negotiatory obligations.18
Canada 19 has the same rule, that general capacity to contract governs
capacity to assume obligations by bills of exchange, with the addition
that the laws or special regulations of a corporation govern in determining whether it is capable of contracting negotiatory obligations.
"Some corporations are given special authority to become
parties to notes and bills by their charters, or by the general laws
by which they are governed. In the case of others it is implied
from the nature of their objects. In the case of a company having
capacity to become party to bills and notes, it will be presumed
that it has officers that can endorse; for it is only through officers
or agents that it can exercise this function." 20
Chile, Colombia,21 and Guatemala 22 have similar provisions, which
refer to the general rules on capacity to define negotiatory capacity. But
the article in the Chilean Code speaks of "persons who are prohibited
from engaging in commerce by reason of age," a clause not in the
Guatemalan provision. This phrase seems to imply a confusion of concepts, and it is difficult to correlate it with other provisions of the Code.
Prohibition and incapacity are two distinct things. Prohibitions are made
in the public interest, as, for example, when brokers 28 or members of a
partnership 24. or a comrnandite,25 are prohibited from engaging in com18

5 CARVALHO DE MENDONQA, TRATADO DE DIREITO COMMERCIAL BRASILEIRO,
pt. 2, 216 (Rio de Janeiro, 1938).
19
"Capacity to incur liability as a party to a bill is co-extensive with capacity to
contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall enable a corpor-ation to make itself
liable as drawer, acceptor or endorser, of a bill, unless it is competent to it so to do
under the law for the time being in force relating to such corporation." Can.-Bills of
Exchange Act, § 4 7.
20
MACLAREN, BILLS, NoTEs AND CHEQUES, 6th ed. by Frederick Read, 141_
(Toronto, 1940).
21
"Las personas que pueden obligarse pueden celebrar el contrato de cambio por su
propia cuenta o por la de un tercero que las haya autorizado especialmente al efecto.
"Las personas a quienes esta prohibido comerciar por raz6n de la edad, la naturaleza
de su profesi6n, dignidad o estado, pueden celebrar el contrato de cambio, y girar, en~osar, aceptar, pagar o cobrar una letra, siempre que lo hagan accidentalmente, sin
animo de especular y violar la prohibici6n." Chile--C. Com., art. 622 (similarly, Col.C. Com., art. 748).
22
Guat.-C. Com., art. 598 (identical with the above provision, omitting the
clause "por raz6n de la edad").
23
Chile--C. Com., art. 57.
24
Chile--C. Com., art. 404, inc. 4.
25
Chile--C. Com., art. 4 74.
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merce. Incapacities are established to protect persons, as in the case of
mmors.
(3) The countries that have enacted no special provision on capacity in the special laws or the corresponding part of the codes, and for
which, to resolve the questiot1, reference must be made to the underlying legislation, comprise: Costa Rica, 26 Cuba,27 Ecuador,28 El Salvador,29 the United States,8° Haiti,81 Honduras,32 Nicaragua,83 Panama,34 Peru,35 the Dominican Republic,86 and Venezuela.87
Thus, by three different methods the countries of America arrive
at a common solution, namely, that negotiatory capacity should be governed by the norms of capacity to assume obligations and to contract.
The writer is in accord with the second method of stating this
principle. Although it is not a necessary and indispensable provision,
it is desirable, in the interest of clarity, to insert it in the laws on bills of
exchange or the relevant part of the commercial codes.
This is a subject outside the proper orbit of a uniform law on bills
of exchange, since it should be governed by internal or national laws.
26 Article 3 of the ,Code of Commerce of Costa Rica refers to the common civil
legislation.
27 Article 2 of the Code of Commerce of Cuba indirectly refers to the common
civil legislation. Moreover, for issue or endorsement of an occasional bill of exchange,
legal capacity to contract will govern. Cf. I GARRIGUES, CuRso DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 584 (Madrid, 1936).
28 Articles 6 and 8 of the Code of Commerce of Ecuador refer to the general
rules of the Civil Code.
29 Articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Commerce of El Salvador indirectly refer to the
Civil Code. Cf. also article l 14 of the Code of Commerce, invalidating signatures by
non-merchant minors.
80 The Negotiable Instruments Law does not contain a provision, as does the
Canadian law, which refers capacity to the underlying law. It may be asserted that:
"I~ general, all persons who can make a legal contract can become parties to commercial paper, •.. the questions of capacity and authority of parties to make, accept, and
transfer negotiable paper are governed by substantially the same rules of law that control
other contracts." l RANDOLPH, A TREATISE OF THE LAw OF COMMERCIAL PAPER, 2d
ed., 432 et seq.,§ 244 (1899).
81
Reference should be made indirectly to the Civil Code of Haiti in those parts of
the Code of Commerce which are not explicit. Cf. also article I l 2 of the Code of Commerce, invalidating signatures by non-merchant minors.
32 Article 5 of the Code of Commerce of Honduras sets forth special rules on
capacity of persons, which are supplemented by the Civil Code, particularly article 15 55.
88
In Nicaragua, article 2 of the Code of Commerce refers to the Civil Code.
84 Article 12 of the Panama Code of Commerce refers indirectly to the Civil Code.
85 In Peru, articles I and 2 of the Code of Commerce refer to the Civil Code.
86
Reference should be made indirectly to the civil legislation in the Dominican
Republic.
87
Article IO of the Venezuelan Code of Commerce refers to the Civil Code.
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But there should be uniformity in the rules determining the applicable
national law, in order to avoid:
A large number of conflicts that arise from the diversity of
legisla~ions relating to civil and commercial obligations in general,
and which are naturally produced when there is a question of
commercial paper. 88

4. Position of Minors
It has seemed interesting to the writer to outline the position of
minors and married women in the American legislations, as indicating
or giving an idea of the so-called underlying laws.30
The transition from inca.pacity or minority to capacity or majority
is fixed by statute. In America, the various legislations have fixed three
different ages:
(I) Majority is acquired at the age of twenty-one in Bolivia,4°
Brazil,41 Canada,42 Chile,43 Colombia,44 Costa Rica,45 Cuba,4° Ecua38

"Une grande nombre de conflits qui naissent de la diversite des legislations
relatives aux obligations civiles et commerciales en general, et qui se produisent naturellement lorsquil s'agit d'effets de commerce." Kuhn, "Principaux problemes souleves dans
le commerce international par les conflits de lois relatifs aux effets de commerce," 8
Recueil des cours 1925, Ill, 139 at 144.
so Gutteridge states in this respect that the question of capacity:
"From a business point of view ... is the least important of the questions which
fall to be discussed. Infants, lunatics and married women are not often in the habit of
affixing their signatures to bills of exchange, and it can only happen very exceptionally
that litigation connected with commercial paper circulating internationally will turn
upon the capacity of a defendant to bind himself by his signature." "The Unification
of the Rules of Conflict Relating to Negotiable Instruments," 16 J. CoMP. LEG., ser.
3, 59 (1934).
Nevertheless, Lorenzen states:
"The principal conflicts that may arise will relate to the capacity of married
women and infants." "The Rules of the Conflict of Laws Applicable to Bills and
Notes," I MINN. L. REv. 11 (1917).
40
Bol.-C. Civ., arts. 195 and 256.
41
Bra.-C. Civ., art. 9.
42
By the common law, and by articles 246 and 324 of the Civil Code of Quebec.
With respect to the underlying legislation, Canada is particularly interesting on account
of the fact that two systems govern, the Anglo-American, which is the Common Law,
and the Continental, which is the Civil Code of the Province of Quebec, based on the
Code Napoleon.
43
Ley 7612, of October I 1, 1943, published in the D1ARIO OFICIAL OF CHILE on
October 21 of the same year, fixed the age of majority at twenty-one years (arts. I and
4), thus amending the Civil Code and Code of Commerce.
44
Col.-C. Civ., art. 34.
45 C. R.-C. Civ., art. 22.
46 Cuba-L. de 19.V.1916, amending article 320 of the Civil Code. 52 Col.
Leg. 51.
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dor 4 ' El Salvador 48 the United States 49 Haiti50 Honduras 51 Mexico 52
53
'
' 4 Peru,5 5 the Dominican
'
'1
Nicaragua,
Panama,5
Republic/6' Uruguay,5
58
and Venezuela.
,
( 2) The age of twenty-two is prescribed in Argentina 59 and Paraguay.ao
(3) And majority commences at eighteen years in Guatemala.61
The powers of minors vary in the different legislations of America.
And especially, they vary within each legislation, depending on the
object of the legal act. Thus, within the same legislation a minor will
be able to accomplish a particular act, if it be done for a specified pur, pose, and not, if for other purposes. Such variations also occur among
the obligations on a bill of exchange, as from endorsement.
The enactments follow different systems in empowering minors to
contract, dependent on whether they engage in commerce, whether
they possess separate property, on their civil status, or on judicial
decree.
The following countries. permit minors to engage in commerce
upon the fulfillment of certain requirements: 62 Argentina, Brazil,
47

Ec.-C. Civ., arts. 21 and 235.
El Sal.-C. Civ., art. 26.
49
In the United States, the age of twenty-one years has been prescribed by the
Com111on Law for centuries as the beginning of majority, for both men and women. Cf.
1 WILLISTON, TREATISE oN THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS, 2d ed., p. 671, § 224 (1936).
But in certain states, this rule has been modified by statutes or laws with respect to
women, who are considered to have attained majority at the age of eighteen years in
Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, North Dakota, and Utah. Id. 622, n. 4.
50
Haiti-C. Civ., arts. 329 and 398.
51
Hon.-C. Civ., art. 269.
52
Mex.-C. Civ., art. 646.
53 Nic.-C. Civ., art. 2 78. The Civil Code of Nicaragua contains a provision that
differentiates it from the other codes, article 280. Although a person has not completed
twenty-one years, he may be declared of age when it benefits him. A male who
has attained fifteen years or a female of fourteen can invoke this provision. See also,
article 1612 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
54
Pan.-C. Civ., art. 34.
li 5 Peru-C. Civ., art. 8.
56
Dom.-C. Civ., arts. 388 and 488.
57
Urug.-C. Civ., art. 280.
58
Ven.-C. Civ., arts. 327 a~d 419.
59
Arg.-C. Civ., art. I 26.
60
Parag.-C. Civ., art. 126.
61
Guat.-C. Civ., art. 6.
62 These requirements are not common to all the countries. In Argentina and
Paraguay, any person over eighteen years of age is permitted to engage in commerce,
provided he proves thaf he is legally emancipated or authorized (C. Civ., art. 10).
48
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Canada (Province of Quebec), Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Para:guay, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela. On
There must be an express authority of the father or the mother, registered and published
in the commercial court. The minor will thereby be considered of age for all commercial acts and obligations (C. Civ., arts. 11-19).
In Brazil, lawfully emancipated minors and children over eighteen years of age
subject to parental authority, with the consent of their parents, can engage in commerce
(C. Civ., art 1). Under this provision, to be able to engage in commerce, the minor
must be over eighteen years of age, and the provision of article 9 of the Civil Code does
not revoke this requirement. Article 9, paragrafo unico, inciso 5, prescribes that the
incapacity of minors ceases when they have a civil or commercial establishment, independently maintained. The Sixth Court 9f Appeals, on December l 1, l 931, held that:
"Para que cesse a incapacidade do menor por effeito de estabelecimiento commercial
com economia propria, e necessario que j a tenha attingido a idade de 1 8 annos, exigida
para a habilita~ao a commerciante, pelo Codigo Commerciale, articulo 1 numeros 2 e 3."
104 REV. D. 398.
.
In Colombia, it is provided by article 15 of the Code of Commerce, that minors
and children subject to parental authority can engage in commerce in those cases where,
conformably to the Civil Code, they are exempted from guardianship, or are emancipated and are granted free administration of their property.
Costa Rica permits a person over twenty years of age to engage in commerce, provided he has been emancipated (C. Com., art. 4).
In Chile, two cases are possible:' (a) minors who administer their separate property (peculio profesional) and engage in acts of commerce, are liable to the amount of
the property; (b) minors, thus contracting, can acquire the statm, of merchants, provided such acts are repeated and they make commerce their regular profession (C. Com.,
arts. 7 and 10). Cf. l PALMA, DERECHO CoMERCIAL 164 (Santiago de Chile, 1940).
In Ecuador, an emancipated minor can engage in commerce, provided he has been
so authorized by his curator and enrolled in the registry office. Moreover, this authority
is presumed, when the minor publicly engages in commerce and the curator does not
protest ( C. Com., art. 9). Such persons_ are regarded as of age for all acts of commerce.
Minors who have separate property (peculio profesional) :md administer it, if they
engage in acts of commerce, are liable to the amount of such property.
El Salvador admits by implication that minors declared of age can be merchants
(C. Com., art. 6) but does not prescribe the requirements therefor. Likewise, it stipulates that minors who have and administer property of their own, are subjec't to liability
to the amount of the property, if they engage in some act of commerce.
In Guatemala, the Commercial Code of l 942, in article 6, prescribes a general
rule, stating:
"Todas las personas que segun las leyes comunes son habiles para contratar y
obligarse y a quienes las mismas leyes no prohiban expresamente la profesi6n del comercio,
tienen capacidad legal para ejercerlo."
·
In Haiti, emancipated minors over eighteen years of age are permitted to engage
in commerce (C. Civ., art. 397), if it is authorized in advance by their parents or
guardians and registered in the commercial court at the domicil of the minor (C. Com.,
art. 2).
In Mexico, those under twenty-one years of age and over eighteen are allowed to
engage in commerce, after emancipation, declaration of age, or authorization by their
guardians. The minor then does not enjoy the benefits of minority (C. Com., art. 6)
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the other hand, Bolivia, Cuba, and Honduras63 do not permit minors
to be merchants. All the countries . enumerated distinguish between
merchants and non-merchants, between commercial codes and civil
codes. In the countries that derive their legislation from the AngloSaxon system, these distinctions do not exist, and the general or ordinary capacity to assume obligations or to contract under the ordinary
law controls. 64
In addition to the powers granted to minors by the commercial laws,
the civil legislation also takes into consideration the development of
discernment in minors, granting them greater powers until they become
complete at majority. On this point the legislations vary, in extent as
much as in method and terminology. 65 For this reason, in case a minor,
and is considered to be of age, notwithstanding the provisions of the common civil
law {C. Com., art. 7).
Nicaragua prescribes in the Code of Commerce {art. 7) that when, having acquired
means, minors dedicate themselves to commerce, they are liable to the amount thereof.
In Panama, minors who are emancipated or declared of age are allowed to engage
in commerce, as if they had attained majority (C. Com., art. 13).
In Peru, it is provided that legally emancipated minors who have free administration of their property, can engage in commerce (C. Com., art. 4; C. Civ., art 514).
The Dominican Republic has a provision similar to that of Haiti (C. Com., arts.
2 and 3).
In Uruguay, any person over eighteen years of age can engage in commerce, if
he is legally emancipated, has capital of his own, and, in the case of orphans, is declared competent to administer his property (C. Com., art. 9). Emancipation for commerce consists in authorization to engage in commerce by the father, mother, or guardian, or judicially decreed, ~hich authorization is to be registered in the commercial
court. The minor is then considered of age for the purpose of all commercial acts and
obligations, and will not enjoy the benefit of restitution (C. Com., art. 10).
In Venezue1a, emancipated minors can engage in commerce and accordingly in
acts of commerce, if they are authorized by their father or mother or with judicial approval
when the curator is not a parent. The authorization is registered in the registry office of
the register of commerce. Thereafter, they are considered of age in person and property (C. Com., art. 12.).
63
Bolivia (C. Mere., art. 2) prohibits the exercise of commerce by minors. Cuba
and Honduras do so by implication, since both require the attainment of twenty-one
years (C. Com., arts. 4 and 5, respectively), except in case the minors continue transactions of their predecessors by means of guardians ( C. Com., arts. 5 and 6, respectively).
64
In Canada, the duality of the Common Law and the Civil Law exists. The same
occurs in the United States, but it is not so marked and typical.
65
Marriage alone emancipates in Argentina ( C. Civ., art. l 3 1) and Paraguay ( C.
Civ., art. l 3 l) irrespective of any form, and whatever be the age of the contracting
parties. It is irrevocable, even though the marriage be dissolved by the death of one of
the spouses. But those emancipated are subject to a series of restrictions, some absolute
and others relative, which require judicial authorization for the execution of acts.
Other countries provide that emancipation may be acquired by marriage or judicial
declaration, and others by marriage or authorization of the father or mother. In Costa
Rica, emancipation may be accomplished by marriage (C. Civ., art. 152), and by the

1944]

CAPACITY IN INTER-AMERICAN LAW

57 1

with limited capacity, contracts a negotiatory obligation, its enforceability against him will depend on all these circumstances.
father or mother who has parental authority, when the minor is over eighteen. It must
be executed by public instrument and recorded in the register of civil status. It is irrevocable (C. Civ., art. 154), and the minor can dispose of his person and property, as
if he were of age (C. Civ., art. 155).
·
In Cuba, emancipation takes place by marriage of the minor, and by concession of
the father or mother exercising parental authority, when the minor is of eighteen years
and gives his consent thereto (C. Civ., arts. 314-318). Article 314 of the Civil Code
also cites as a form of emancipation attainment of majority, but majority properly speaking is not emancipation but complete capacity in fact of the individual. The legal
concept of emancipation is:
"A acquisi!;iio da capacidade civil antes de edade legal." 1 BEVILAQUA, C6DIGO
CIVIL DOS EsTADOS UNmos DO BRASIL coMENTADO, 6th ed., 198 (Rio de Janeiro, 1940).
It confers capacity on the emancipated minor, but it carries restrictions on alienation
(C. Civ., art. 317).
In Haiti and the Dominican Republic, emancipation by operation of law (de
pleno derecho) takes place on marriage (C. Civ., arts. 386 and 476, respectively). It
may be granted by declaration of the father or mother when the minor is fifteen (C.
Civ., arts. 387 and 477-, respectively). Orphans of eighteen years may be emancipated
with the approval of the family council. Emancipated minors have only administration
of their property, there being restrictions on alienation (C. Civ., arts. 391 et seq., and
484 ct seq., respectively). Emancipation is revocable (C. Civ., arts. 396 and 487,
respectively).
In Mexico, marriage results in emancipation (C. Civ., art. 461). Minors over
eighteen years can petition therefor, when they satisfy certain conditions of competence
(C. Civ., art. 642). The minor has free administration of his property, but with restrictions on alienation (C. Civ., art. 643).
In Nicaragua, by virtue of article 280 of the Civil Code, a minor can be declared
of age. Moreover, he can be emancipated by marriage and by authorization of the father
or of the mother in his absence (C. Civ., art. 271). In the first case, he must be over
eighteen years, and in the second, he must be over eighteen and the emancipation must
be agreed to by the minor (C. Civ., arts. 273 and 274). Emancipation enables the
minor to control his person and property as if he were of age (C. Civ., art. 272).
In Panama, emancipation may be effected by marriage or declared judicially
(C. Civ., arts. 205 and 206); in the latter case, the minor must be over eighteen years
of age. He can control his person and his property as if he were of age. When the
minor is an orphan, having neither father nor mother, he can be declared of age at
eighteen by the competent tribunal (C. Civ., arts. 209 and 210), subject to restrictions
(C. Civ., art. 13).
In Uruguay, it is provided that the methods of terminating parental authority
include lawful marriage (C. Civ., art. 280, inc. 3) and emancipation granted by
parents to children over eighteen years of age (C. Civ., art. 280, inc. 4), which must
be effected by public instrument, with the consent of the minor ( C. Civ., art. 28 1) and
authorized by the proper judge. It is irrevocable. The restrictions to which those·
declared of age are subject, apply (C. Civ.,,art. 283). Orphans over eighteen years of
age, without father or mother, who have the necessary aptitude, may be judicially
declared of age (C. Civ., art. 302). It is irrevocable (C. Civ., art. 304) and carries
restrictions (C. Civ., arts. 308, et seq.).
In Venezuela, emancipation may be by marriage (C. Civ., art. 382) or by court
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5. Married Women
In this connection, only the position of married women will be
treated, since single women are governed by the same regime as men,
according as they are adults or minors. In some legislations, they have
proceeding when the minor is over eighteen years (C. Civ., art. 383). It confers
' capacity to perform acts of administration only (C. Civ., art. 388).
Other countries prescribe three grounds or sources of emancipation, namely, judicial, voluntary, and statutory. Thus, in Bolivia, a minor is emancipated when he
marries (C. Civ., art. 248), and.may be emancipated by his father when he has reached
the age of fifteen years, this being effected by declaration of the father before the court
(C. Civ., art. 249). A minor who has been orphaned can be judicially emancipated
when he has reached eighteen years (G. Civ., art. 250). Emancipation is revocable for
just cause (C. Civ., art. 253).
In Ecuador, the three types of emancipation likewise apply, but it is irrevocable
(C. Civ., arts. 261, et seq.).
Other countries, Colombia, El Salvador, and Honduras, have two complementary
institutions. They recognize voluntary, statutory, or judicial emancipation, which
puts an end to parental authority and is irrevocable (C. Civ., arts. 294, 258, and 248,
respectively). In addition provision is made for Jiabilitaci6n de edad, a privilege granted
to a minor to enable him to execute all acts and contract all obligations of which
those of age are capable, with certain restrictions, particularly respecting alienation of
property. In Colombia, El Salvador, and Honduras, married p'ersons over eighteen are so
habilitated by force of law (C. Civ., arts. 340, 297, and 270 respectively). In other
cases, it is necessary to be emancu,ated and to have attained eighteen years.
In Chile, parental authority over the minor can be terminated by means of
emancipation, which may be voluntary, statutory, or judicial (C. Civ., art. 264).
Other countries provide various grounds for emancipation. Thus, in Brazil, under
article 9 of the Civil Code, these may be: consent of the parents when the minor is
eighteen, judicial decree (if the minor, being eighteen, is under guardianship), marriage, ,exercise of public office, the conferring of a scientific degree by an institution of
higher education, independent maintenance of a civil or commercial establishment.
The law provides that emancipation terminates incapacity, and therefore full
ciyil capacity is acquired. Cf. l BEVILAQUA, C6DIGO C1v1L DOS EsTADOS UNIDOS DO
BRASIL COMENTADO, 6th ed., 198 (Rio de Janeiro, 1940). It is irrevocable.
In Peru, the Civil Code contains provisions similar to the Civil Code of Brazil.
It provides:
"La incapacidad de las personas mayores de l 8 aiios cesa por emancipaci6n, por
matrimonio y por obtener titulo oficial que autorice ejercer una profesi6n u oficio."
(C. Civ., art. II). Em11ncipation is effected by a judicial proceeding with the consent
of the minor (C. Proc. Civ., arts. 1039 and 1047). It is irrevocable and confers full
capacity.
Guatemala, as we have observed, provides that majority is attained at the age of
eighteen years. It also enables minors to execute civil acts; for example, they are considered to have attained majority for the purpose of administering property acquired by
their own industry or profession (C. Civ., art, 192).
In the United States a~d Canada, countries where the c;ommon Law predominates,
especially in the former, emancipation is recognized, but it has a much more limited
meaning than that attributed to it, as stated above, in the various civil codes. Reference
is made principally to the services that a minor can render, employment, and the earnings he acquires thereby. Emancipation may be effected by express agreement and also
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certain incapacities in law, which it is not pertinent to consider in this
work, not having direct connection with bills of exchange. Perhaps the
unique case of restriction imposed on women as women is that of Haiti,
which provides that the signatures of women, not merchants, on bills of
exchange are invalid with respect to them, being but simple promises. 66
The situation of married women varies under the legislations of the
countries of America. Some deem the married woman to have capacity;
others, to have capacity with the imposition of certain restrictions; and
others consider her to be relatively incompet~nt in fact. 67 The question of the married woman's capacity or incapacity is intimately related
to the matrimonial regime, 68 namely, the rules regulating the property
by the special circumstances surrounding a case, when the parents refuse necessary support
for the minor's sustenance, except where the minor refuses to accept support in the
parental household. Cf. l WILLISTON, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, p. 624, § 225
(1931). Emancipation gives minors power to use the earnings which they obtain for
their services, as well as power to contract therefor. Emancipation may be partial and
revocable, except when it is given with sufficient consideration or is under seal. In
certain states, the Common Law has been modified by statutes, whereby a female minor
contracting marriage, is considered of age with full contractual capacity (thus in Alabama, California, Maryland, Nebraska, Oregon, Texas, and Washington;. cited in
l WILLISTON, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 622, n. 7 (1931), and, in certain other states,
a man or woman, by contracting marriage, becomes of age ( thus in Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Washington, and Utah; cited, id., n. 8).
For a full discussion of emancipation in the United States, both at Common Law
and under the statutes of the various states, see 5 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS
240 et seq.,§ 282 (London, 1931-1938).
' According to the Civil Code of Lower Canada, a minor can be emancipated by
marriage (by operation of law, C. Civ., art. 314), judicially (C. Civ., art. 315), and
extra-judicially, subject to review by the courts (C. Civ., art. 316). The minor acquires
capacity for certain purposes, including administration of his property (C. Civ., art.
319). But there are restrictions, and the obligations that the minor contracts are subject to review by the court or tribunal (C. Civ., art. 322, par. 2).
66
Haiti-C. Com., art. I I 1.
61
The present writer submits that the incapacity of the married woman is factual
and relative (de hecho y relatioa), because it does not depend on her sex, namely, her
being a woman, but on the fact of contracting marriage, it being possible for her to
execute acts by representation or with authorization. As 2 CLARO SoLAR, ExPLICACIONES
DE DERECHO CIVIL CHILENO 76 (Santiago de Chile, 1937) states:
"La incapacidad de la mujer casada consiste, esencialmente en que la mujer no
puede en principio, ejecutar validamente los diversos actos juridicos sin autorizaci6n
que por regla general debe emanar del marido."
68
l t seems appropriate to provide a summary of the principal matrimonial regimes,
in the interest of clarity when reference is made to one of these. For full discussion of
matrimonial regimes, see ALESSANDRI RoDRIGUEZ, TRATADo PRACTICO DE LAS CAPITULACIONES MATRIMONIALES, DE LA SOCIEDAD CONYUGAL Y EL LOS BIENES RESERVADQS DE LA
MUJER CASADA (Santiago de Chile, 1940). See also, as a comparative study, although at
present there are modifications, De la Vega, "Capacite de la femme mariee dans le droit
de l' Amerique latine," found in PUBLICATIONS DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT COMPARE, DE
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and the pecuniary interests of spouses between themselves and in their
relationships with third persons. The views of the respective countries
differ on whether married women should be competent or relatively
incompetent, but it may be said that there is a tendency to regard the
married woman as having capacity, as evidenced by the various laws
modifying the civil codes. 69
L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS, ser. 1 (Paris, 1933), and RoGUJN, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL coM. PARE, LE REGIME MATRIMONIALE (Paris, 1905). The principal systems are community
property, separation of property, participation of gains, without community, and dotal.
(1) Community of property. The property of husband and wife, whether contributed to the marriage or acquired during it, constitutes an aggregate or common
fund, which belongs to the conjugal partnership ,and which is divided when the community is dissolved. The property is generally managed by the husband, and the
woman is incompetent to perform legal acts without the husband's consent or supplementary permission.
This community regime may be complete or partial. When the community is complete, all property of the spouses is included, whether contributed to or acquired during
the marriage. Partial community, as its name indicates, does not include all the properties of the spouses, certain properties being reserved. Two types of partial community
may exist: (a) community of moveables and gains, under which all moveables and gains
acquired during the marriage are included in the common fund, immoveables remaining as reserved property, and (b) community of gains, which is characterized by inclusion in the common fund of moveables and immoveables acquired during the marriage
for value (a titulo oneroso), individual property of all kinds being reserved.
(2) Regime of separation of property, in which there is no pecuniary community
or association. Each spouse retains the assets that he contributed to the marriage, as
well as those he acquires during its duration, administering them independently. This
also may be partial or complete, according as all or certain property is affected.
(3) Regim~ of participation of gains, a regime combining the two preceding. It
consists in the retention by each spouse of the administration arid ownership of property
contributed to as well as acquired during the marriage, but, upon its dissolution, in the
inclusion of the property derived from gains of both spouses in a common fund, for the
sole purpose of liquidation and participation.
(4) and (5) The regime witliout community and the dotal regime are the least
frequently used. The former involves division of the property of the woman into property contributed and personal. The former is administered by the husband; the personal
property pertains to her. In the dotal regime, there is also a division of the property
of the woman into dotal and paraphernal property. The dotal property is the aggregate of property that the woman delivers to the husband for him to administer, covering
part of the domestic expenses, and paraphernal property is that of which the woman
has the management and disposition. The dos, generally, must be returned at the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, for which there exists a statutory mortgage on
the property of the husband.
69 It is pertinent to cite the modifications with respect to married women that
have been introduced in the French Civil Code, since this code has been one of the most
important sources of all the civil codes of the countries of America. By law of February
18, 1938, 38 Collection des lois n.s., 156, Book I, Title V, Chapter VI of the Civil
Code was amended by the grant of civil capacity to married women. The most important modification is stated in the new article 215, by which the married woman is
given full capacity, subject to limitation only by law or by the matrimonial regime
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Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, 70
adopted. For full discussion, see L. Juillot de la Morandiere, 15 DALLOZ, REcUEIL
HEBDOMADAIRE (1938) 25 et seq. Also Herchenroder, "The Capacity of Married
Women in French Law," 20 J. CoMP. LEG., ser. 3, p. 196 (1938).
70 Argentina. Ley 11357 of 1926 on the civil rights of women, has amended the
provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes with respect to married women. A married woman may, without marital or judicial authorization, engage in a lawful profession, office, employment, or business, administering and freely disposing of the products
of such occupations (art. 3, inc. 2, let. a). This provision, therefore, amends articles
13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 of the Code of Commerce. Moreover, and most important from
the point of view of this work, it amends article 630 of the Code of Commerce, which
stated that "El derecho de endosar una letra firmada o endosada a favor de una mujer no
casada que posteriormente contrae matrimonio, pertenece al marido," since now this
right to endorse a bill does not enure to the husband. But, by virtue of article 3, inciso z,
letra c, of the law cited, the husband can endorse when he administers the property.
Thus, it should be considered that the:
"Derecho de endosar una letra firmada o ertdosada a favor de una mujer que
luego se casa corresponde a ella, y no al marido, a no ser que este, por no haber hecho
la esposa la manifestaci6n de voluntad •.• conserve la administraci6n." 4 MALAGARRIGA,
CoDIGO DE COMERCIO COMENTADO, SEGUN LA DOCTRINA Y LA JURISPRUDENCIA, 3d ed.,
160 (Buenos Aires, 1928).
The endorsement of the husband, when he has administration of the property, would
be perfectly valid. The matrimonial regime, although it has suffered slight modifications in extent, continues to be that of community of gains.
Canada. On this subject, the legislations of the provinces vary among themselves,
particularly that of Quebec. In the majority of the provinces, the original law was that
of the Common Law, under which the married woman is relatively without capacity, and
therefore incompetent to contract obligations by bills of exchange on her own account.
But the En~lish Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Viet., c. 75, provides
that a married woman who has separate property, actual or anticipated, can contract
obligations as if she were f eme sole. This act governs in the provinces in which it has
been adopted. Thus, there has resulted the matrimonial regime of complete separation.
Colombia. According to Ley 28 of 1932, on patrimonial regime in marriage,
married women have free administration and disposition of property that belonged
to them at the moment of contracting marriage or that they contributed, as well as of
other property that they had acquired or may acquire (art. 1) ; for this, authorization by
the husband or supplementary license by the court is not required (art. 5). The Colombian regime in marriage is that of participation of gains.
Costa Rica. The civil legislation imposes no incapacity on married women, who
require neither authorization by the husband nor by the court to contract (C. Civ., art.
78). One distinction only is to be made: if the marriage was celebrated with a marriage
settlement, including a stipulation on administration of property, this will be governed
accordingly. Without a marriage settlement, each spouse retains control and free disposition of his property, both that which he had upon contracting marriage or that which
he acquires in any manner during the marriage. Moreover, contracts between the
spouses are permitted (C. Civ., art. 76).
Cuba. Article 43, parrafo 4, of the Constitution of Cuba (1940) provides that:
"La mujer casada disfruta de la plenitud de la capacidad civil, sin que necesite
licencia o autorizaci6n marital para regir sus bienes, ejercer libremente el comercio, la
industria, profesi6n, oficio, o arte, y disponer libremente del producto de su trabajo."
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married women are considered to have capacity. The same is true in the
And article 20 of' the same constitution declares illegal and punishable any discrimination on account of sex. These constitutional provisions have broadened evei;i. more
those of the law of July 18,,1917, on the capacity of the married woman. The first part
of article 43, parrafo 4, speaks of "controlling her property" (regir sus bienes), and it
seems to follow therefrom that she can perform all the acts necessary for the management, alienation, or disposition of her property, thus confirming article 4 of the law of
1917 cited. The matrimonial regime continues to be that of community of gains.
El Salvador. Ac_cording to the Civil Code, married women have full civil capacity.
Article 189 provides that:
"Los c6nyuges podran ,contratar entre sf, y la mujer no necesita autorizaci6n del
marido ni del juez para celebrar toda clase de contratos ni para comparecer en juicio."
The regime of complete separation of property governs.
United States of America. The general principle respecting married women may
be stated, adopting the words of Page, as follows:
"At Common Law, subject to certain exceptions, it was well settled that an
executory contract entered into by a married woman was void, and even now no contract is enforceable against her unless under the provisions of some statute." 2 PAGE,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 1427 (1905).
Se also: 1 RANDOLPH, A TREATISE OF THE LAw OF CoMMERCIAL PAPER, 2d ed., 475
et seq. (1899); 1 DANIEL, A TREATISE oN THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,
7th ed., 346 et seq. (1933); EATON AND GILBERT, A TREATISE ON CoMMERCIAL
PAPER AND THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 62 et seq. (1903); STORY, CoM,MENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF ExcHANGE, 3d ed., II2 et seq. (1853). But the
rules of the Common Law, under which married women are incompetent to con.tract on
their own account, are modified by statutes or laws in almost all the states of the United
States, and very little remains of the Common Law rules. To the present day, so far as
the rules of the Common Law prevail, a married woman is incompetent to contract an
obligation, whether as drawer, endorser, or acceptor of a bill of exchange, since she is
considered feme covert. The states have the power to legislate on this subject and have
done so, the pertinent provisions varying from one state to another. The majority of the
states recognize by statute the regime of complete separation of property and the
capacity of married women. For the different relationships between husband and wife
with respect to property and acts, see 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW (London,
1931-1938).
Honduras. The principle is that married women have full capacity. Article 173
of the Civil Code permits contracts between the spouses, and the wife does not need
authorization by the husband nor by the court in order to contract obligations. The
matrimonial regime may be that of separation of property or marriage 'settlement
(C. Civ., art. 169).
Mexico. The Civil Code provides in article 2 equality of legal capacity for men
and women. Therefore, women are not subject, by reason of sex, to any restriction on
the acquisition and exercise of ,civil rights. Implementing this general provision, article
172 of the Civil Code states:
"El marido y la mujer, mayores de edad, tienen capacidad para administrar, contratar, o disponer de sus bienes propios, y ejercitar las acciones µ oponer las excepciones
que a ellos corresponden, sin que para tal objeto necesite el esposo del, consentimiento
de la esposa, ni esta de la autorizaci6n de aquel; salvo lo que se estipule en las capitulaciones matrimoniales sobre administraci6n de los bienes."
Moreover, article 169 of the Civil Code enables women to fill an office, engage in a
profession, industry, or in commerce, when such does not interfere with woman's mis-
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United States.11 Other countries, such as Bolivia, . Guatemala, and
Peru,72 consider the married woman to have capacity, but with certain
restrictions. Others continue to consider the married woman relatively
sion. The husband can object on serious and just grounds, when he provides for all
household expenses, and, in case of disagreement, decision rests with the court (C. Civ.,
art. 171). The matrimonial regime may be that of a marriage settlement, in which
the administrator of the community is to be designated (C. Civ., art. 189) or, when
there has been no agreement, that of separation of property.
Nicaragua. Married women have full capacity, according to article 157 of the
Civil Code, contracts being permitted between spouses and authorization by husband or
judge not being necessary for women to contract or to appear in court. The regime is
that of complete separation of property.
Panama. Similar to the preceding as regards capacity and with respect to the
matrimonial regime (C. Civ., arts. n63 and 1167).
Dominican Republic. Ley 390, of December 18, 1940, which grants full capacity
of civil rights to the Dominican woman (1 Col. Leyes 1940, 439), has fundamentally
changed the concepts of the Civil and Commercial Codes on this subject. According
to article I of the law referred to, a woman who has attained majority, whether single
or married, has full capacity for the exercise of all civil rights and- functions, under the
same conditions as a man. The restrictions on the civil capacity of women, which may
result from the fact of marriage, will derive only from provisions that the law may
expressly enact in certain cases. By virtue of said article 1, and articles 215 and 216 of
the Civil Code, as amended by this law, it is understood that article 113 of the Commercial Code, which provides that signatures of non-merchant women on bills of
exchange are valid only -as mere promissory notes, is amended. At present, a woman
can exercise freely any office or industry, and, if the husband opposes, the judge decides.
According to article 5 of the law of 1940, a woman, under whatever matrimonial
regime, enjoys the administration and disposition of property resulting from her labor,
as well as of her own or reserved property. It thus appears from the context of the law,
that there exists the regime of community of gains (art. 8) and, in certain cases, of
separation.
71
For a summary of the state statutes respecting married women, see CREDIT
MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAW 264 et seq. (1943). See also the preceding note.
72
Bdli'llia. The law of October 21, 1936, 2 Annuario Administrativo de 1936,
p. 2199, and CARLOS WALTER URQUIDI, LEGISLACI0N VIGENTE DESDE EL 17 DE MAYO
DE 1936, p. 296 (Cochabamba, 1936) on the civil rights of women, and the legal and
economic regime of the conjugal partnership, has modified the provisions of the Civil
Code and the Code of Commerce. These, however, do not give wide latitude to the
capacity of married women. ln 2 Annuario Administrativo de 1936, 2199, joined to
the heading of the decree, appears between parentheses a statement to the effect that
''This decree has not been applied." It has not been possible for the writer to determine
what is meant by this statement: whether the decree has not entered into force, or has
been repealed, or merely has not been applied in practice. If any of these possibilities
has occurred, what law governs this subject? Without stating an opinion, the writer
has followed this decree, since article 102 thereof states that all provisions which may
conflict with this decreto-ley are repealed.
·
Article 8, incise 2, and article 44, provide that the husband has the administration
of the earned and patrimonial property of the woman but requires authorization for
certain acts. When the woman is engaged in a profession, she can effect all the acts that
such profession demands (art. 20). Two matrimonial regimes may exist: that of com-
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without capacity; these are Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Haiti, Paraguay,
Uruguay, and Zenezuela. 73
'

6. Effects of Endorsement by Incompetent
What effects are produced by the endorsement of a person without
capacity as respects other obligations appearing in the bill of exchange,
is a question the solution of which will depend on the conception of the
munity of gains and that of separation of property. In this latter case, each of the
spouses has free administration and disposition of the paraphernal property (art. 55).
'
Guatemala. In general principle, married women are not incompetent. Two matrimonial regimes may exist during marriage: (1) that of marriage settlement (C. Civ.,
art. 100), in which settlement, the contracting parties must state whether separation of
property or community of gains is adopted; (2) if there is no marriage settlement, each
contracting party remains owner and disposes freely of the property that he had upon
contracting marriage and may acquire during the same (C. Civ., art. 104), a supplementary form being that of community for designated property. In the community
regime, the husband is administrator of the property (art. 106), but the woman does
not need authorization by the husband nor by the judge to contract when there is
property of her own (C. Civ., art. 108). The Code of Commerce supplements the
provisions of the Civil Code. According to article 7, a married woman who has attained majority can engage in commerce, if she has entered into a marriage settlement
_ and adopted the regime of separation of property. And if the woman publicly engages
in commerce without having concluded a marriage settlement or if, having done so,
she did not adopt the regime of separation of property, the consent of the husband
is presumed for all acts related to the profession (C. Com., art. 8).
Peru. The new Civil Code of Peru, of 1936, prescribes an intermediate system
for the capacity of married women. The matrimonial regime is that of community of
gains (C. Civ., art. 176), and each spouse retains administration of his own property
(art. 178), the husband being administrator of the common property (C. Civ., art.
188}. The woman can contract and dispose of her property without other limitations
than those derived from the legal regime (C. Civ., art. 172). Women can engage in
any profession, but for this the husband's consent or supplementary permission by the
court is necessary ( C. Civ., art. l 73}. The regime of separation of property may also
exist.
78
Brazil. The general rule concerning married women is given by article 6,
No. II, of the Civil Code, prescribing that married women are relatively without
capacity for certain acts or with respect to the mode of their execution, while the conjugal society subsists. The husband is the head of the family and of the conjugal society
and manages the property (C. Civ., art. 233), but the husband is subject to restrictions
and in many cases must have the authorization of the woman (C. Civ., art. 235). The
woman requires the husband's consent for many acts (C. Civ., art. 242), among them
to engage in a profession (No. VIII). Once authorized, she can perform all the acts
inherent in her profession (C. Civ., art. 246). The normal matrimonial regime is that
of community of gains, but the systems of dos and separation of property may exist,
according to the stipulations and circumstances. Likewise, the Code of Commerce
enables a married woman to engage in commerce, when she is authorized to do so
(C. Com., art. 1, No. IV).
Chile. (According to the amendments to the Civil Code and the Code of Commerce made by Ley 5521, of December 19, 1934). The present article II of the
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bill of exchange that is entertained. The theory or principles incorporated in the law governing bills of exchange, indicates the pattern for
the relations between the di:fferent negotiatory obligations.
Code of Commerce refers to article l 50 of the Civil Code for women who engage in
commerce. The general principle, established by article 13 7 of the Civil Code, is that
a married woman cannot, without her husband's consent, conclude any contract nor
incur obligations. This rule is subject to important modifications when the woman
engages in a profession or industry (C. Civ., art. 149, inc. 1), in which case article 150
of the Civil Code takes effect. A married woman can nevertheless freely dedicate herself to the exercise of an employment, industry, commerce, etc., except when the court,
in a summary proceeding, prohibits her from doing so: The normal regime is that of
community of gains, but separation of property can also exist. Article l 50, parrafo 3, of
the Civil Code, contains the following provision, which modifies the matrimonial regime:
"La mujer casada, de cualquier edad, que desempeiie algun empleo o que ejerza
una profesi6n, oficio, o industria, separados de las de su marido, se considerara separada
de bienes respecto del ejercicio de ese empleo, oficio o industria y de lo que en ellos
obtenga, no obstante cualquiera estipulaci6n en contrario; ..."
Consequently, a woman is considered without capacity, while she has no occupation,
and to undertake one the husband's consent is not necessary. Thus, it may be said that
only a vestige of incapacity remains.
.
Ecuador. According to article I 3 l of the Civil Code, a woman cannot, without
the husband's consent, conclude any contract nor incur obligations, except by judicial
authorization (C. Civ., art. 137). A woman can execute all acts inherent in her profession. When a married woman is a merchant, articles l 2 and l 3 of the Code of Commerce govern. The regime is that of community of gains, but there can be separation
of property.
H oiti. The system that the Code of Commerce, in conformity with the Civil
Code, enacts, is exceedingly strict in reference to bills of exchange. It includes not only
married, but also single women, except merchants of both classes. Signature by a woman
is valid only as a simple promise ( C. Com., art. 1 1 1). A female merchant can, of course,
contract by bills of exchange. But in order to be such, as well as to engage in an isolated act of commerce, the husband's consent is necessary (C. Corn., art. 4). The matrimonial regime is that of community of gains.
Paraguay and Uruguay. The Civil Code of Paraguay, in article 5 5, provides that
married women are without capacity with respect to certain acts or the mode of their
execution (inc. 2). Article l 280 of the Uruguayan Civil Code provides that married
women are without capacity. A woman must have her husband's permission to c9ntract
(arts. 189 and 131, respectively), and the husband is administrator of all the property
(C. Civ., art. l 86 and 130, respectively). The rnatrimon'ial regime is that of community of gains, separation of property being possible in certain cases.
The Codes of Commerce of Paraguay and Uruguay (arts. 630 and 826) state:
"El derecho de endosar una letra firmada o endosada a favor de una rnujer casada
que posteriormente contrae matrimonio, pertenece al rnarido."
This provision applies to non-merchant women. It must not be taken to include a
married woman who is a merchant, since articles l 3 and X5, respectively, stipulate that
the marriage of a woman merchant does not alter her rights and obligations, and she is
presumed to be authorized to engage in commerce while her husband does not manifest
the contrary. An endorsement will be deemed the husband's in case a woman merchant
marries, provided the husband does not give formal notice to the contrary. A married woman, satisfying the statutory requirements, can be a merchant with her husband's
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One of the principles that has been established by legal theory and
modern legislations is that of the autonomy of the obligations appearing
in a bill of exchange: The principle of autonomy may refer to two
classes of relations: (a) the relation of the instrument or bill of exchange to the underlying transaction, and (b) the relation of one obligation to the others appearing in the bill. It is to the latter that the
principle of autonomy is properly applied. For the former, the word
"abstraction" is employed.
Vivante presents the concept of autonomy as follows:
The right is autonomous, because the holder in good faith
exercises an original right which cannot be limited or destroyed by
virtue of the relations existing between the preceding holders and
the debtor. 74
The principle of autonomy has its principal and most important application in the exclusion of defenses; i.e., there cannot be alleged
against a subsequent holder exceptions that might have been maintained against his transferor, nor do defects in the right of the one who
· transfers a bill affect the.holder's position, if not apparent on its face ..
To be valid, autonpmy requires another element, that of good faith.
Without good faith on the part of the acquirer, he loses the benefits of
autonomy. Thus Tena states:
There cannot be opposed against a party who acquires an inconsent, but she cannot-be judicially authorized contrary to the husband's will. Once
they are merchants, married women can execute all the acts necessary for their trade.
In Paraguay, according to the Constitution of 1940, rights of women, which are
to be regulated by law, are recognized. Article 23 provides:
"Los derechos civiles de la mujer ser:in regulados en la ley, atendiendo la unidad
de la' familia, la igualdad de la mujer y el hombre y la diversidad de sus respectivos
funciones en la sociedad."
Venezuela. In marriage, if there is no express agreement, the regime of community
of property exists (C. Civ., art. 148), but, at the same time, a distinction is made between separate property of the spouses and common property. Each spouse has free
disposition of his own property, but cannot dispose of it by gift (C. Civ., art. 154); the
husband manages the common property, and the wife that which has been acquired by
her labor (C. Civ., art. 186). The matrimonial regime is that of community of gains.
A married woman, satisfying the established requirements, may engage in commerce
(C. Com., arts. 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18), and in such case execute all the acts necessary
for its exercise.
74 "El derecho es aut6no~, porque el poseedor de buena fe ejercita un derecho
propjo que no puede ser restringido o destruido en virtud de las relaciones existentes
entre los anteriores poseedores y el deudor." 3 VIVANTE, TRATADO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL, translation by Ricardo Espejo de Hinojosa, 136, n. 953 (Madrid, 1932-1936).
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strument of credit in good faith, the personal exceptions that perhaps might have been opposed against his transferor. 76
The transferor might not have had the right to transfer the bill,
whether because his ~ight had been extinguished, or because he had
never had it, or, as in the case that concerns us, because he did not have
capacity to transfer the instrument, y~t the transfer to the third party
holder in good faith will not be less valid on this account.
By virtue of autonomy, the obligations become independent of each
other, and the right of a holder in good faith is independent of the right
of his transferor. The Roman principle, nemo plus furis in alium trans!erre potest quam ipse habet, is not pertinent in the modern law of
negotiability. Security of transactions and the protection of good faith
in credit relationships require that the Roman principle be excluded.
These premises established, let us examine the effects of the signature of a person without capacity.
·
It may be observed that the signature of a negotiatory obligation
has a double function, formal and substantive. By formal function of
the signature, it is understood that the signature performs the purposes
for which it was affixed, in relation to the other obligors or transferees,
serving to legitimate the acquirer's title and to transfer the instrument.
By substantive function are meant the effects that the signature produces
' as respects the signer and his obligation on or right to the instrument.
This relation may involve the power to demand performance of the
obligation or inability to do so.
Nullity of the signature of a person without capacity relates to this
latter function, i.e., performance cannot be required of him. Vivante
states:
Incapacity of the obligor does not deprive the signature of its
formal function; if it appears as the signature of the drawer or issuer, it does not rob the bill of its ability to accept other negotiatory
obligations, of acceptors, avalistes, or endorsers, which will produce all negotiatory effects. If it appears as the signature of an
endorser, it will serve to perfect the series of endorsements.76
7
s "A quien adquiere de buena fe un tftulo de credito, no pueden oponersele las
excepciones personales que ta! vez pudieron oponerse a su causante." 2 TENA, DERECHO
MERCANTIL MEXICANO, 2d ed., 53 (Mexico, 1938).
76
"La incapacidad de! obligado no priva a la firma de su funci6n formal; si
figura como firma de! librador o de! emisor, no despoja a la letra de cambio de su
aptitud para recoger otras obligaciones cambiarias, de aceptantes, avalistas o endosantes,
que produciran todos l~s efectos cambiarios. Si figura como firma de endosante servira
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The formal significa.nce of the signature is that, although intrinsically invalid, extrinsically it retains its entire force and does not affect
the other obligations. 7 7
Now, the two functions of the signature, formal and substantive,
apply to endorsement and produce consequences in its effects. Endorsement has two principal effects, the first translative· of title to the
bill and the second constitutive, that of guarantee. By the first, the endorser transfers to the endorsee all the rights inherent in the bill, and,
by the second, he makes himself responsible on the bjll, in favor of the
endorsee and subsequent transferee~, for acceptance and payment. Applying the above to the signature of a person without capacity, the translative effect of the endorsement will be produced by the formal function
of the signature, and, in the absence of the substantive function, the
constitutive effects of the endorsement will fail to be produced.
It must be kept in mind that the personal right of the endorser does
not pass to the endorsee. In this respect endorsement differs from assignment. What is transferred is the right existing or incorporated in
the instrument.
Angeloni explains 78 that endorsement requires cap~city on the part
of the endorser to assume negotiatory obligations at the moment of the
transfer of the instrument. The endorser's incapacity makes the constitutive effect of the endorsement disappear, so that an endorser without capacity, by alleging his incapacity, ran free himself of liability for
acceptance and payment of the bill, to any holder who prosecutes an action on the bill ( acci6n cambiaria) against him. On the other hand, this
does not impair the translative effect, not even as against the endorsee,
although he knew or should have known of the endorser's disability,
since the formal existence of the endorsement is sufficient to legitimate
the negotiation of the bill with respect to all subsequent holders.
para integrar la serie de las endosos." 3 V1vANTE, TRATADO DE DERECHO MERCANTIL,
translated by Ricardo Espejo de Hinojosa, 225, n. 1035 (Madrid, 1932-1936).
77
2 TENA, DERECHO MERCANTIL MEXICANO, 2d ed., 214 (Mexico, 1938) says
with outstanding clarity:
"Ni la incapacidad de_ alguna de las signatories del titulo, ni la falsedad de alguna
de las firmas que contiene, ni la nulidad, en una palabra, que per cualquier motive pueda
afectar cualquiera de las obligaciones, ejercen la menor influencia sabre la validez del
titulo con respecto a los demas obligados. Asi lo preceptua el articulo 1 2. De don de se
sigue que la falta de validez de referencia es exclusivamente material, como dice Bonelli.
Formalmente, las firmas sin valor lo conservan integro, en el seni:ido de que dejan
inatacables las obligaciones de las demas signatories, aun de las sucesivos al signatorio
incapaz."
78
ANGELONI, LA CAMBIALE E IL VAGLIA CAMBIARIO SECONDO LA LEGGE UNIFORME
DI GINEVRA 136 (Roma, 1936).
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7. International Conventions
Article l 3 of the draft uniform law on bills of exchange, presented
by Germany at The Hague Conference of 19 IO, provided that, if a bill
carries forged signatures or those of persons without capacity to bind
themselves by bills of exchange, these should not influence the validity
of the other obligations. The Avant-Projet d'une Loi Uniforme sur
la Lettre de Change et le Billet aOrdre provided the same, referring in
article 8 only to the signature of persons without capacity:
At The Hague Conference of 1912, the article of the Avant-Project
was reproduced in article 7 of the Uniform Regulation, which states:

If a bill of exchange bears the signature of parties not having
capacity to contract, the liabilities of other signers shall be nontheless valid. 79

In the Geneva Uniform Law, the same principle is enunciated in
article 7, but broadened, as in the draft presented by Germany in 19 IO.
In addition to the signatures of persons without capacity, forged signatures or those of fictitious persons, or those that for any other reason
do not bind the persons who affixed them or in whose name they were
signed, do not affect the remaining obligations. 80
This solution, with which the present writer agrees, is a broad approval of the principle of autonomy, applying to all cases in which one
obligation is invalid, while the others do not therefore cease to be valid.
8. American Legislation on Autonomy

In the positive legislation of all the countries of America, the conclusion may be reached that nullity of the obligation, in a bill of exchange, of a person without capacity, does not affect na"r invalidate the
other negotiatory obligations.
To reach this conclusion, the various legal systems have followed
two paths: ( l) through express provision in the law on negotiability or
the relevant part of the code of commerce treating bills of exchange,
establishing the validity of the other obligations on the bill; and (2)
through supplementary provisions in the commercial or civil codes, con79
"Si une lettre de change porte la signature de personnes incapables de s'obliger,
les obligations des autres signataires n'en sont pas moins valables." La Haye, 1912,
I Actes 245.
so In this conference the opinion was unanimous that the principle of independence
of negotiatory obligation should be adopted. See the discussion of article 7 in Geneva,
1930, Records 189 et seq.
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firming the principles adopted in the laws on negotiability or referring
to parties who can allege incapacity.
In the first group are Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, the United States, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru, and Venezuela. In the second are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic,
and Uruguay.
The provisions of Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru are quite
sim~lar. The Brazilian law 81 provides that negotiatory obligations are
autonomous and independent of each other, and that the signer of an
obligation continues to be liable even when there exists forgery, falsification, or nullity of any other signature. Incapacity comes under the
provision respecting "nullity of any other signature." 8ll
The Code of Commerce of El Salvador 88 recognizes negotiatory
autonomy by prescribing that each signature placed on a bill of exchange
subjects the signer to the obligation implied thereby, notwithstanding
the nullity of any other obligation or the falsity of any of the signatures.
In Mexico, the Ley General de Titulos y Operaciones de Credito 84
enacts the independence of the obligations on a bill, in a detailed and
comprehensive provision that the incapacity of any one of the signers
does not invalidate the other obligations. ·
The Code of Commerce of Peru 85 prescribes that bills bearing the
signatures of persons without capacity shall be valid with respect to
persons having capacity who subscribe.
The legislations of Ecuador,86 Guatemala,87Nicaragua,88 and Venezuela,89 which follow or have adopted the Hague Uniform Regulation,
provide that, if a bill bears the signature of persons without capacity to
assume obligations, this shall not affect the validity of the obligations
contracted by the other signers.
The Ley de Cambia of Costa Rica 90 envisages this subject from
another point of view; it ,gives the holder in good fajth the right to
demand payment from any other party, when the bill is drawn or
81 Bra.-Dec. 2044, art. 43· '
Cf. 5 CARVALHO DE MENDONgA, TRATADO DE DIREIT0 COMMERCIAL BRASILEIR0, 3d ed., pt. 2, 221 (Rio de Janeiro, 1938) and Bra.-Dec. 2044, art. 153.
88
El Sal.-C. Com., art. 453.
84 Mex,_2_Ley General de Titulos y Operaciones de Credito, art. 12. See Tribunal
Supremo de Justicia, Dist. y Terr. Fed. 30.IX.1938, 23 AN. J. 259.
88
85 Peru-C. Com., art. 512.
Nic.-C. Com., art. 606.
89
86 Ec.-L. de 5.XII.1925, art. 7.
Ven.-C. Com., art. 396.
9
87 Guat.-C. Com., art. 612.
°C.R.-L. Cam., art. 19.
82
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endorsed by a person without capacity. The result is the same, but this
introduces a new element, the good faith of the holder.
The four American countries that follow Common Law conceptions
with reference to bills of exchange are, as is well known, the United
States, Canada, Colombia, and Panama. The Colombian law did not
incorporate section 22 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, so that the
solution on this point has been supplied by other provisions. The
United States and Panama have a common provision, which reads:
"The indorsement or assignment of the instrument by a corporation or by an infant passes the property therein, notwithstanding that from want of capacity the corporation or infant may incur
no liability thereon." 91
It is pertinent to note that this provision refers only to endorsement or
assignment. The Canadian law, on the other hand, refers to issue or endorsement.92
If the theory is accepted that a signature on a bill of exchange may
have two functions, substantive and formal, the first referring to the
obligation of the signer and the second to pe1;formance of the purposes
for which it was affixed, it will be easy to understand the provision
mentioned above. As for the substantive purposes of the signature, a
minor or a corporation cannot ht bound if without capacity for such act.
But, the signature is sufficient to have formal effect, i.e., to give external
validity to the bill, and for this reason the signature of such parties
transfers title to the bill.
When the substantive function or purpose of the signature is nonexistent, the constitutive effect of an endorsement is suspended, i.e., it
does not guarantee acceptance or payment of the bill, but, by virtue of
its formal function, the effect of transferring title to the bill containing
the endorsement remains intact.
Contracts of minors with other parties,98 i.e., when persons without
91 U.S.-N.I.L., § 22; Pan.-L.52 de 1917, art. 22.
Can.-Bills of Exchange Act, § 48.
It may be said that the contract of a minor is generally voidable, and that only he
or his representatives can allege its invalidity, while he or his representatives can demand
performance of the contract. Moreover, the contract can be ratified. Cf. BIGELOW, ThE
I.Aw OF BILLS, NoTES AND CHECKS, 3d ed., 177 (1928); I RANDOLPl'I, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CoMMERCIAL PAPER,.2d ed., 463 (1899); 1 DANIEL, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 7th ed., 335 (1933). He would be liable
on a contract for "necessaries," and
"By necessaries are meant those things which are needed by the infant, and are
suited to his means and rank in life." I DANIEL, A TREATISE oN THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 7th ed., 336 (1933).
92
98
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capacity are bound, are not-considered in this study. But it is of direct
concern whether a person without capacity, having transferred an instrument and having rescinded his contract, can demand restitution of
the bill.
"The statute changes the law" 94 on this point. Although a person
without capacity can rescind the contract of endorsement and demand
compensation or damages, as may be indicated, he cannot demand restitution of the bill itself. Title once transferred, the bill continues in
circulation. The relations between the incompetent and the party with
whom he contracted, cannot modify the title already transferred. This
is the writer's interpretation.95
Bigelow 96 maintains the contrary, that the minor can "recover the
instrument or its proceeds." This is based on the view that section 22
"seems merely declaratory of the unwritten rule." 97 The existing situation is set forth with great clarity by the American Institute of Banking,
when it states: "The courts have held that the infants can disaffirm the passage of title and recover the instrument from the indorsee. The
question must be deemed unsettled, for it would seem better to
regard the effect of the indorsement as irrevocably vesting the
title to the instrument in the indorsee though not creating liability
against the infant." 98
The provision commented upon refers only to corporations and to
minors, but by analogy it should apply to any other class of persons
-without capacity.99
Rescission· of the endorsement of a person without capacity, therefore, does not affect the other obligors on the bill, and the holders can
demand performance from any of the remaining parties. This conclusion is reached by applying principles expressed in other legal provisions,100 according to which the drawer guarantees the capacity of the
payee to endorse the bill, the acceptor guarantees the capacity of tq.e
drawee, every qualified endorser, negotiating the instrument, guaranCRAWFORD, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 4th ed., 55 (1918).
Cf. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw ANNOTATED, 6th ed., 318
(1938).
96
BIGELOW, THE LAW OF BILLS, NoTES AND CHECKS, 3d ed., 318 (1928).
97 Id.
98 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, publication of the American Institute of Banking,
64 (1941).
99 Cf. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED, 6th ed., 319
(1938).
100
U.S.-N. I. L., §§ 61, 62, 65, 66; P~n.-L.52 de 1917, arts. 61, 62, 65, 66-.
94
95
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tees that prior parties had capacity to contract, and every endorser without qualification guarantees the same.
·
In an indirect and confused way, the same result as autonomy of.
obligations is reached with reference to this problem.
In this subject, Canada more clearly establishes autonomy of obligations.101 It enables the holder to demand payment from any of the
other parties,. when the bill has been drawn or endorsed by a mihor or
a corporation.102 Although other incapacities are not cited, the writer
believes that by analogy the same should apply to them. There is no
reason of any kind to make distinction.
But if the analogy were not deemed acceptable, the same result
could be reached by indirect methods; namely, that the acceptor,
drawer, or endorser is prohibited from alleging the lack of capacity of
the party to whom he is liable, according to sections r29, r30, and r33.
The Colombian law, a version of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
does not contain section 22 of the latter. Nevertheless, it is possible to
arrive at the same solution by means of the guarantees made by one who
puts his signature on a bill. By articles 62 and 63, the issuer of an instrument or the drawer guarantees the existence of the payee and his
capacity to endorse. By article 64, the acceptor guarantees the capacity
of the drawer, and by articles 67 and 69, whoever negotiates the document by delivery, or by qualified endorsement or endorsement, guarantees the capacity of prior parties.
The Code of Commerce of Chile contains no express provision on
this subject, but the context of the Chilean legislation,as illustrated by
article 635, relating to falsification, adopts the doctrine of autonomy of
negotiatory obligations. The fact that an endorsement is made by a
person without capacity does not deprive of validity nor affect the other
signatures appearing in the bill.103
The Codes of Commerce of Haiti and the Dominican Republic provide104 that bills signed by non-merchant minors are void with respect
to them, without prejudice to the respective rights of other parties.105
101 Can.-Bills of Exchange Act, § 48.
102 "It is not necessary to the validity of a bill that the drawer or endorser should
be liable." MACLAREN, BILLS, NoTES AND CHEQUES, 6th ed., 146 (1940).
103 Cf. I DAVIS, LA LETRA DE CAMBJO 180 {Santiago de Chile, 1928}, stating:
"Si la persona incapaz es un endosante, los endosatarios futuros tendran acci6n
contra los demas endosantes, el aceptante y el librador, puesto que la incapacidad d,el
deudor carece de toda influencia en las obligaciones de las personas capaces que se han
vinculado a la circulaci6n del titulo."
104 Arts. l 12 and I I 4, respectively.
105 This rule applies to issue, endorsement, acceptance, or aval. 4 LYoN-CAEN and
RENAULT, MANUEL DE DROJT coM.MERCJAL, 14th ed., 421, § 483 bis {Paris, 1924).
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These provisions refer to the position of the minor who has undertaken
an obligation. These codes make no provision with respect to the other
obligations in the bill, but the writer believes that such would be entirely valid. This interpretation is based on the fact that a party having
capacity cannot set up tjie invalidity of the obliga,tion of a person without capacity, as a defense.106
_
Although it seems that the Bolivian provisions do not adopt the
principle of autonomy,107 one may reach the same conclusion as in all
the other countries by applying article 7r6 of the Civil Code, which
states:
Persons having capacity to contract cannot assert the incapacity
of the person under disability, with whom they have contracted.1°8
The Code of Commerce of Cuba, in the part referring to en9-orsements, incorporates the concept that an endorsement is an independent
contract and may be regarded as equivalent to a new issue of the bill,
subject to differences with respect to liability, which is more limited.109
As a consequence, it may be said that:
By the endorsement of a bill and acquisition of the same by
the transferee, ... a legal relation is established, which in no way
affects the other contracting parties.110
Thus, if there is an endorsement void as having been made by a person without capacity, it cannot prejudice the remaining obligors on the
,bill of exchange.111
106

The renowned commentators, Lyon-Caen and Renault, state:
"Plusieurs lois etrangeres formulent expressement la regle incontestable, du reste,
meme dans les pays, comme la France, ou elle n'est pas formulee par la loi, d'apres
laquelle, si une lettre de change porte la signature d'un ou plusieurs incapables, les autres
signataires n'en sont pas moins obliges." Id. at p. 432, § 510.
Cf. BoRNO, CODE DE COMMERCE HAITIEN MIS AU COURANT DE LA LEGISLATION
EN VIGEUR (Port-au-Prince, 1910).
107
Bol.-C. Mere., arts. 367 and 368.
108
"Las .personas capaces de obligarse, no podran reclamar la incapacidad del prohibido, con quien han contratado'."
Cf. a sentencia of the Supreme Court on May 10, 1887, G.J. No. 566, No. 8, 8 at 9,
in which it is asserted:
"La circunstancia de ser menor su hermano, no vicia ni invalida la obligaci6n contraida por el ejecutado."
109
Cf. MARTINEZ ESCOBAR, LETRAS DE CAMBIO, LIBRANZAS, CHEQUES, VALES Y
PAGARES 282 (La Habana, 1929).
110
"Con el endoso de una cambial y adquisici6n de la misma por el cesionario, ..•
se establece una relaci6n juridica, la cual no afecta para nada a los demas contratantes."
PINOL AcuLL6, CoMENTARios 154.
111 Piiiol gives the interpretation that, although it be void, it does not prejudice·
subsequent endorsements, just as if it were valid. He relies for this interpretation on the
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The codes of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Honduras, which
are similar in their treatment of this subject, contain no express provision on the effects of an endorsement by a person without capac;:ity on
the other obligations appearing in the bill. The writer believes that the
solution lies in the context or thedry followed by these codes. Thus,
different provisions 112 adopt the principle of autonomy of obligations,
by enacting that a bill of exchange constitutes a distinct and personal
obligation relative to each one who signs it. One Argentine court "18
has held that the incapacity of the drawer cannot be invoked against a
second or later endorsee, provided he received it in good faith, and another has held that the grounds of invalidity based on article rn42 of
the Civil Code were established for the exclusive benefit of parties contracting without capacity.114
It may be recalled that an endorsement made by a person without
capacity is not a forged endorsement and cannot fall within. the con~
ception of forgery. 115 ·
8. Conclusions
From the preceding analysis various conclusions and principles can
be deduced, which it seems desirable to accept:
Negotiatory capacity should be governed by the general rules on
capacity to contract and to assume obligations.116
sentencia of the Supreme Court of Spain, of June 15, 1897, which deals with false
endorsements, The difference between nullity on account of falsity and nullity for
incapacity has been set forth above.
112
Arg.-C. Com., arts. 625, 735, 736.
Parag.-C. Com., arts 625, 735, 736.
Urug.-C. Com., arts. 822, 928, 929.
Hon.-C. Com., art.'526.
This solution is confirmed by the Civil Codes; Arg.-C. Civ., art. 703, Parag.C. Civ., art. 703, which provide:
"Aunque uno de los acreedores fuese incapaz de_ adquirer el derecho o colitraer la
obligaci6n, esta no dejara de ser solidaria para los otros. La incapacidad solo puede ser
opuesta por el acreedor o deudor incapaz." Cf. Urug.-C. Civ., art. 1567.
Confirmed in Honduras by article l 600 of the Civil Code.
Id., Luxs MoRENo, PRAcTICA DEL DERECHO CIVIL HONDURENO 269 (Tegucigalpa,
1934).
118
Cam. Civ. 2 de la Cap., 24.XII.1934, 48 Jurus. ARG. 875.
Cf. Yadarola, "La reforma de la legislaci6n cambiaria argentina en base a la Iey
uniforme," EL DERECHO CAMBIARIO ARGENTINO y LEGISLACION UNIFORME, PROYECTO
DE REFORMA, Instituto argentino de estudios legislativos, publicaci6n 6, p. 58 (Buenos
Aires, l 940).
114
See 2 SEGOVIA, ExPLICAc16N Y CRITICA DEL NUEvo C6moo DE CoMERCIO
DE LA REPUBLICAARGENTINA 125, n. 2127 (Buenos Aires, 1933).
115
Cam. de Paz Letrada (Sala 1), 6.VII.1937, 7 La Ley 3n.
116
Cf. CARLOS MALAGARRIGA, LA UNIFICACION INTERNACIONAL DE LA LETRA
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It is desirable to state this principle generally for all negotiatory
obligations, in order to avoid confusion or the need to resort to interpretations, which are often dangerous.
The principle of the autonomy of obligations should be comprehensively accepted, and, as a corollary; the invalidity of a signature on a
negotiable instrument on account of incapacity should not affect the remaining obligations appearing in the bill.
The defense ·of incapacity is available only to a party without capacity; it is provided for his exclusive benefit, and he can oppose it erga
onmes. This is one of the points with respect to which the formal nature
of the bill of exchange is dominated by the so-called underlying transaction. With much justice, Tena comments on this principle, to the
effect:
·
- And we think it never will be otherwise, at least while it is
believed that the norms established on the subject of capacity by
our civil and commercial codes are norms of public order, nonabrogable by the will of individuals.117
16 (Buenos Aires, 1916):
"Que la capacidad para obligarse por letra de cambio no debe ser otra que la capacidad general para contratar."
117 "Y nosotros pensamos que no lo tendra nunca, al menos mientras se crea que las
normas establecidas en punto a capacidad por nuestros c6digos civil y comercial, son
normas de orden publico, inderrogables por la voluntad de los particulares." :z TENA,
DERECHO MERCANTIL MEXICANO, 2d ed., 213 (Mexico, ·1938).
DE CAMBIO l

